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SCHREYER v SCHREYER:  SHOULD 
BRITISH COLUMBIA CARE? 
 
MARK R. SLAY* 
 
Many families in British Columbia and throughout Canada are 
currently faced with the prospect of not being able to meet their 
financial obligations. Not surprisingly, many find themselves 
facing the prospect of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act1 (the “BIA”) supposedly provides the 
opportunity for an orderly liquidation process, a degree of 
protection for creditors, and an opportunity to give debtors a 
fresh start. However, add marital property claims into the mix 
with a bankruptcy and the supposed protection offered by the 
BIA may have the effect of creating uncertainty as to what 
property can be pursued upon a separation. 
 
 In a timely decision last year, the Supreme Court of 
Canada had the opportunity to weigh in on the interplay of 
insolvency legislation and family property division schemes 
across the country. In Schreyer v. Schreyer,2 the Court had to 
consider the perceived clash between family law and 
bankruptcy law in seeking to resolve the claim by a wife denied 
entitlement to her previously agreed-upon equalization 
payment. In reaching the result, the Court offered significant 
comment for legislative reform so as to avoid bankruptcy and 





                                                
*  North Shore Law, North Vancouver, British Columbia.  
1  Bankrupty and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA]. 
2  2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 SCR 605 [Schreyer]. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The Schreyers resided in Manitoba. They had a long-term 
marriage of nineteen years prior to their separation. In 1997, 
two years before their separation, the husband purchased a 
farm from his parents. Title was registered solely in his name. 
He financed the purchase by way of a mortgage.3 The parties 
lived together on the farm. 
 
Upon separation, a divorce action was brought in 2000. 
Later in the same year, a consent order was entered into for a 
valuation of their family assets. It would appear that the farm 
was the most significant asset that either of them owned. The 
valuation was to occur pursuant to the Manitoba Family 
Property Act4 (the “FPA”). 
 
However, before the valuation had been completed, the 
husband made an assignment in bankruptcy. The wife was not 
listed as a creditor and did not receive notice of the bankruptcy.  
The husband was discharged from bankruptcy in November, 
2002. Nonetheless, the valuation proceeded under the FPA. 
The trial court confirmed an amount due to the wife of 
$41,063.48 in 2007. 
 
Of note, under the Manitoba Judgments Act,5 the 
family farm was exempt from execution by creditors under the 
husband’s bankruptcy. As such, the farm did not form part of 
                                                
3  Interestingly, there is no mention in the decision as to whether the 
wife guaranteed the mortgage. If she had, this may have amounted to 
what Belinda Fehlberg, an Australian legal scholar, has identified as 
“sexually transmitted debt” or “STD”: Belinda Fehlberg, Sexually 
Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
4  SM 2002, c 48, CCSM c F25 
5  CCSM c J10.  
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the bankrupt estate and the husband was thus able to continue 
to own and live on the farm, both throughout and subsequent to 
his discharge from bankruptcy. The husband was thus able to 
benefit from the insolvency legislation. As it transpired, the 
wife was not. 
 
Upon appeal to the Manitoba Court of Appeal,6 it was 
held that the model for the distribution of family assets in that 
province was based on an equalization theory, as opposed to 
the actual division of property. As such, the wife’s claim only 
gave rise to a personal claim against the husband. It was a 
claim “provable” in bankruptcy and, in the result, extinguished 
by the husband’s discharge from bankruptcy. The Court 
rejected the wife’s argument that her claim should survive the 
bankruptcy on the basis that the farm was exempt property.   
 
The wife appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
EQUALIZATION VS. PROPERTY DIVISION 
 
Mr. Justice LeBel delivered the reasons for the Supreme Court. 
The panel of seven justices was unanimous in dismissing the 
wife’s appeal. The reasoning from the court below was upheld. 
However, the Court embarked upon a considered analysis of 
the effect of the bankruptcy upon defeating the wife’s valid 
claim under the family law legislation. Mr. Justice LeBel was 
quick to note: 
 
Despite the apparent injustice of the outcome, it 
is impossible to wash away the fact and problem 
of the respondent’s bankruptcy.7 
 
                                                
6  2009 MBCA 84. 
7  Schreyer, supra note 2 at para 9. 
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 In the analysis of the Court, the problem lay with the 
fact that Manitoba has adopted an equalization model of 
property division. The equalization model requires one spouse 
to pay to the other an amount in money or otherwise receive a 
transfer of assets in lieu of that amount. 
 
In contrast, the division of property model, which has 
been adopted in British Columbia, gives rise to a proprietary or 
beneficial interest in the assets themselves. The court found 
that the equalization model created a relationship that was more 
in the nature of debtor-creditor in that the creditor spouse 
obtains a monetary claim against the debtor spouse.  
 
The court also added: 
 
Despite the proven wisdom of the policies 
underpinning the insolvency legislation, it is 
understandable that few appreciate the haircuts 
or even outright losses that bankruptcies trigger.8 
 
The court analyzed the structure and policy of the BIA, 
noting that creditors will seek, where possible, to avoid its 
application by seeking security on third-party guarantees. 
Statutory exemptions may also apply; however, the court 
recognized that the more exemptions there are, the less likely it 
would be that the basic policy objectives of insolvency 
legislation could be obtained.9 
 
Mr. Justice LeBel was clear that: 
 
 ... the interpretation of the BIA requires the 
acceptance of the principle that every 
claim is swept into the bankruptcy and that 
                                                
8  Ibid at para 19. 
9  Ibid at para 19. 
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the bankrupt is released from all of them 
upon being discharged unless the law sets 
out a clear exclusion or exemption.10 
 
Counsel for the appellant, no doubt getting a sense of 
the way the judicial wind was blowing, argued that in fact the 
Manitoba legislation created a ‘hybrid claim’, giving rise to 
proprietary rights. However, the court rejected this on both 
legal and policy grounds. First, it held that any proprietary 
interest arose only at the remedial stage and only upon the 
parties’ agreement or court order. Secondly, the court said that 
to accept such an interpretation would be to interfere with the 
clear policy choice that the Manitoba legislature made in 
adopting the equalization model. 
 
The court, after undertaking an analysis of what a 
provable claim is, confirmed that the wife’s claim was one that 
was provable in the bankruptcy. Even though the amount of the 
claim had not been identified at the date of the bankruptcy, or 
for that matter by the date of the husband’s discharge, it was 
not so uncertain as to avoid the scope of the BIA. The court 
affirmed: 
 
A right to payment existed in this case from the 
time of separation of the spouses, and hence 
existed at the time of the bankruptcy.11 
 
Only the quantum remained to be determined. As the claim of 
the wife was not proprietary in nature, the husband’s 
bankruptcy and discharge had the effect of releasing him from 
further liability. 
 
                                                
10 Ibid at para 20. 
11  Ibid at para 27. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010] 126 
APPLICATION OF SCHREYER IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA 
 
As British Columbia is a property division jurisdiction, the 
immediate dilemma faced by Mrs. Schreyer does not 
necessarily arise. However, the issues arising within the case 
do give rise to concerns here.   
 
The division of matrimonial property in British 
Columbia is governed by the Family Relations Act12 (the 
“FRA”). Section 56(1) sets out as follows: 
 
 Subject to this Part and Part 6, each spouse is 
entitled to an interest in each family asset on or 
after March 31, 1979 when 
(a) a separation agreement, 
(b) a declaratory judgment under section 57, 
(c) an order for dissolution of marriage or 
judicial separation, or 
(d) an order declaring the marriage null and void 
respecting the marriage is first made. 
 
 The happening of any of the events referred to in 
section 56(1) of the FRA is referred to as a ‘triggering event’.  
Upon the occurrence of a triggering event, each spouse has an 
undivided one-half interest in all of the family assets as tenants 
in common. The interest each spouse is entitled to is vested at 
that time. Further, the interest is not limited to an undivided 
one-half interest in its value, but in the asset itself.13   
 
 Given the underlying nature of the property regime in 
B.C., the immediate problem presented by Schreyer does not 
necessarily arise. Nonetheless, there is still cause for concern 
                                                
12  Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128. 
13  Blackett v Blackett (1989), 22 RFL (3d) 337 (BCCA). 
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with respect to the intersection of family law property rights 
and bankruptcy legislation in B.C. These relate primarily to the 
timing of the bankruptcy in relation to the occurrence of the 
triggering event under the FRA.   
 
Three areas of concern currently exist in this regard: 
 
Bankruptcy Before a Triggering Event 
 
B.C. courts have determined that, as the vesting of the spouses’ 
interests in family assets only arises upon a triggering event, a 
prior declaration of bankruptcy will defeat any claim by a 
spouse against family assets in the possession of the bankrupt 
spouse.14 
 
 As in most bankruptcies, those assets will vest free and 
clear in the trustee, subject to the claims of the secured 
creditors and subject to any exemptions recognized under the 
BIA.15  
 
Bankruptcy After a Triggering Event  
  
Before Division of Assets 
 
An assignment in bankruptcy subsequent to a triggering event 
does not adversely affect the vesting of an undivided one-half 
interest as tenant in common in any family assets.16 The trustee 
will still take the other half interest in the property pursuant to 
section 71 of the BIA. 
 
 
                                                
14  Biedler v Biedler (1983), 33 RFL (2d) 366, [1983] 5 WWR 129 
[Biedler].  
15  Walters v Walters (1985), 62 BCLR 334, 56 CBR (NS) 104 (BCSC). 
16  Biedler, supra note 14. 
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After Division of Assets 
 
 If assets have already been divided by either agreement 
or court order, the trustee will be limited to only pursuing 
property not otherwise dealt with.17   
 
 However, it should be noted that if the agreement or 
order has given rise to a monetary obligation which has not 
been perfected at the time of the bankruptcy, the claim will be 
treated similarly to those of other unsecured creditors. This was 
the precise problem faced by Mrs. Schreyer. It is not 
uncommon in property agreements for one party to accept a 
lump sum settlement in return for surrendering any claims 
against family assets held by the other party. In such an 
instance, reference must be made to section 67 of the BIA to 
determine if property vested in the trustee is property which is 




Under the BC Court Order Enforcement Act18 (“COEA”), 
provision is made for the allowance of exempt assets. Personal 
property is dealt with under section 71 and real property is 
dealt with under section 71.1. However, under both sections, 
the exemptions are very small. The debtor is only allowed an 
exemption of between $9,000 and $12,000, depending on area 
of residence, in the proceeds of sale of their principal residence 





                                                
17  Re Speklie (1996), 18 BCLR (3d) 229, 39 CBR (3d) 7 (BCSC). 
18  Family Relations Act, supra note 12.  
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BC FAMILY LAW ACT 
 
After many years of discussion, albeit mostly not in the 
legislature, the B.C. Family Law Act (the “FLA”) (Bill 16-
2011) was given assent on November 23, 2011.19  However, it 
has yet to be proclaimed. Coincidentally, as with the FRA, 
property division is dealt with in Part 5 of the Act. Section 81 
sets out as follows: 
 
Subject to an agreement or order that provides 
otherwise and except as set out in this Part and 
Part 6 [Pension Division],  
(a) spouses are both entitled to family property 
and responsible for family debt, regardless of 
their respective use or contribution, and 
 
(b) on separation, each spouse has a right to an 
undivided half interest in all family property as a 
tenant in common, and is equally responsible for 
family debt. 
 
 The obvious significant difference between the existing 
language of the FRA and that of the FLA is when the 
entitlement to an undivided interest in family property arises. 
The FLA contemplates that this interest will arise “on 
separation”.  There no longer appears to be the need for a more 
proactive triggering event such as an order for dissolution of a 
marriage. 
 
 “Separation” is not defined in the new Act.  However, 
the FLA does provide, in section 3(4): 
                                                
19  Bill 16, Family Law Act, 4th Sess, 39th Parl, British Columbia, 2011 
(assented to 24 November 2011), SBC 2011, c 25, online: 
<www.leg.bc.ca/39th4th/3rd_read/gov16-3.htm#part3div2>. 
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For the purposes of this Act, 
(a) spouses may be separated despite continuing 
to live in the same residence, and 
(b) the court may consider, as evidence of 
separation,  
(i) communication, by one spouse to the other 
spouse, of an intention to separate permanently, 
and 
(ii) an action, taken by a spouse, that 
demonstrates the spouse’s intention to separate 
permanently.  
 
 Therefore, for the purpose of property division, parties 
are not considered to have separated if, within one year after 
separation, they have lived together for the primary purpose of 
reconciliation. Such a period of reconciliation must total 90 
days. However, the 90 days are not required to be consecutive, 
as long as the period of reconciliation occurs within one year of 




Trustees dealing with property in B.C. currently have to 
consider if there are any outstanding or pending claims against 
matrimonial property. Firstly, they need to determine the status 
of any family proceedings including claims against property. 
They will have to determine whether any orders or agreements 
have been made or entered into. 
 
 Even if an order or agreement has been made, the 
trustee should determine if it has been perfected, as it may 
determine what property may yet vest in the trustee. The issue 
of trust property will also have to be considered. 
 
 The trustee’s inquiries will become more broad once 
the FLA is proclaimed. The trustee will have to determine if 
the parties were separated at the time of the assignment into 
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bankruptcy. Also, the trustee may have to monitor the marital 
status of the parties for one year after the alleged separation. 
Any reconciliation attempt in excess of 90 days during that 
year may give rise to additional property vesting in the trustee. 
This may affect the date on which a discharge can be granted in 
British Columbia.   
 
 Spouses in B.C. must act expeditiously if they 
anticipate that their partner is considering bankruptcy. 
Obtaining a triggering event as soon as possible will make it 
much easier to protect their claims against matrimonial 
property. Once the FLA is proclaimed, it will be easier to 
pursue claims as only a “separation” is needed. However, clear 
and cogent evidence of that separation will likely be needed if 
the spouse hopes to stave off claims by the trustee against 
disputed property.   
 
 Certainly the pending FLA is likely to expand the 
incidents of conflict between competing claims for marital 




In Schreyer, the Supreme Court of Canada urged Parliament to 
act quickly to clear up the likes of the loophole that gave rise to 
the dilemma with which the Court was faced, noting that the 
remedies under the BIA for claims against marital property are 
limited. The court did hold out the prospect of pursuing a 
spouse after a discharge from bankruptcy through spousal 
support, as section 178(1)(c) of the BIA accords special 
treatment for obligations arising for maintenance or support of 
a spouse or children.20 However, the court recognizes that this 
option may not always exist and it is a poor fallback position 
when considering that it is a failing in the BIA to give effect to 
the wife’s claim to her share of family assets.   
                                                
20  BIA, supra note 2 at para 37. 
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As family law practitioners know, these claims are 
inherently difficult to pursue and even if successful may prove 
empty if the bankrupt has no means to pay. 
 
In a not so subtle prompt, the court noted that it has 
been almost eight years since the Senate Standing Committee 
on Banking, Trade and Commerce report on the BIA 
recommended “prompt resolution” for such inequities. 
Specifically, it was recommended that bankruptcy should not 
stay or release a claim against exempt assets under either 
model for dividing family property. Mr. Justice LeBel said: 
 
More than seven years have elapsed since the 
Committee issued its report. It seems to me that 
this matter is ripe for legislative attention so as 
to ensure that the principles of bankruptcy law 
and family law are compatible rather than being 
at cross purposes.21 
 
In reaching the conclusion that it did, the Supreme 
Court went to great lengths to point out that this is a case where 
the law appears to trump common sense: 
 
I do not doubt that an outcome like this one in 
this appeal looks unfair, given that the 
appellant’s equalization claim was primarily 
based on the value of an asset – the farm 
property – which was exempt from bankruptcy 
and therefore not accessible to other creditors. 
None of the underlying policies of the BIA 
require that the appellant emerge from the 
marriage with no substantial assets. Parliament 
could amend the BIA in respect of the effect of a 
bankrupt’s discharge on equalization claims and 
                                                
21  Ibid at para 40. 
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exempt assets. But the absence of such an 
amendment makes the outcome of this case 
unavoidable.22 
 
One cannot help but agree with the Supreme Court that 
until the necessary legislative changes are made, creditor 
spouses must be wary of the BIA. Even in a province with a 
division of property regime, like British Columbia, there is a 
clear need for a review of the BIA to ensure that it does not 
interfere with the prima facie property rights of spouses upon 
separation. Given the continuing uncertain economic future in 
Canada, Mrs. Schreyer is likely to have more company before 
any review of or protection is offered her under the BIA. 
 
                                                
22  Ibid at para 25.  
